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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, June 22, 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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USSR: Carpathian Military Exercise

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[] *The Soviets told military attaches in Moscow on Monday that their military forces will hold an exercise in the Carpathian Military District in July. This is the fourth exercise that the Soviets have announced in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the Helsinki accord. The Soviets have invited all Warsaw Pact countries, Yugoslavia, and five West European countries to send representatives to observe the exercise.*

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[] This is the largest number of non-Pact countries invited to a Soviet exercise; it is also the first time that countries other than those near the exercise area have been invited. Although such exercises may be scheduled well in advance, the timing of the invitations appears planned to coincide with the Helsinki followup talks now under way in Belgrade.

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[] The exercise will take place from July 11 to 16 near Poland. It will involve both ground and air force units, with as many as 27,000 men participating. The Helsinki accord calls for notification 21 days in advance of maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops and taking place within 250 kilometers of a frontier with another European conference participant.

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[] According to the Helsinki Final Act, invitations to observers are not required. This spring, the USSR announced an exercise in the Odessa Military District, but issued no invitations to non - Warsaw Pact members. Four of the five non-Pact nations invited to the July exercise--West Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland--had never before received invitations to observe a Soviet maneuver.

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[] There have been other indications the Soviets are easing their opposition to an expansion of the military-related "confidence-building measures." The head of the Soviet delegation to the talks in Belgrade told West German diplomats earlier this month that "some" had previously approached the subject of the confidence-building measures too fearfully, and indicated that the Soviets might now advance some proposals of their own.

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25X1 [] The USSR's desire to divert the focus of attention
at the talks in Belgrade from the subject of human rights is
25X1 an influential factor in its effort to appear more accommodat-
ing on other issues. []

ISRAEL: Four Cabinet Leaders

25X1 [] *The senior members of the new Israeli cabinet appear to share generally similar views on crucial foreign policy issues. Within his cabinet, Prime Minister Begin's most influential advisers will be Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, and probably Education Minister Zevulun Hammer. All four are strong personalities, and their differences in ideology, personality, and background may encourage considerable jockeying for relative positions, particularly if Begin's health deteriorates.*

25X1 [] Defense Minister Ezer Weizman was Begin's number-two man in the Herut faction of Likud and probably will play the same role in the cabinet. The two have long been political allies, but they are not personally close and neither has forgotten that Weizman was dropped from the Herut executive in late 1972 after trying to oust Begin as head of the party. A certain amount of uneasiness continues to mark their relationship.

25X1 [] Like Begin, Weizman thinks peace negotiations should focus on the Sinai and the Golan Heights where certain concessions might be possible. He also shares Begin's views on the occupied West Bank and Gaza; both men argue that, for security reasons, Israel must retain them.

25X1 [] As defense minister, Weizman will be responsible for administering the occupied territories, and he has stressed that he plans no major changes in policy. Specifically, he intends to maintain the status quo on interfaith relations and police restrictions on Jewish prayers in the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. On domestic issues, Weizman, a former air force head, is likely to give priority to developing the Israeli aircraft industry and aggressively marketing its products.

25X1 [] Much of Weizman's time will probably be spent keeping an eye on Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, probably his main

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rival for influence in the Begin government. Although he publicly denies it, Dayan probably thinks he has an excellent chance to succeed to the leadership of Likud should Begin leave the scene. Weizman also sees himself as Begin's successor and, should Begin suffer another heart attack or have to delegate substantial authority, the rivalry between Weizman and Dayan is likely to come into the open.

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[] Dayan was brought into the government largely because of his good ties with the West European and US Jewish communities, where his reputation as the hero of the 1967 war still stands. It is unlikely that Begin, although he respects Dayan's abilities, will delegate substantial authority to his foreign minister. Dayan, a pragmatist and original thinker, may grow restless under Begin, although his concern about his political future--he clearly cannot return to the Labor Party--will keep Dayan from publicly expressing any discontent.

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[] The brilliant [] agriculture minister, Ariel Sharon, also will apparently have a major voice on defense and foreign affairs matters. Sharon, a military hero of the October 1973 war, will not be restricted by his agricultural portfolio from serving in Begin's inner cabinet.

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[] Sharon's views on foreign policy issues are basically compatible with Begin's. Sharon is an outspoken opponent of any concessions on the issue of the West Bank. Sharon has, however, suggested a plan for negotiations with various Arab states involving concessions in the Sinai and the Golan Heights; the plan is somewhat more flexible than what Begin has advocated.

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[] Sharon also has advocated talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization, but his purpose was to expose the PLO's "immoderate" positions and thereby discredit it as an acceptable partner in negotiations.

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[] Sharon, who rejoined Likud after the election, has had an uneven political career. He was a founder of Likud, but split from the party and later joined the Rabin government as an adviser. His relations with some Likud partisans, notably members of the Liberal faction, are not good.

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[] A fourth major force in the government will probably be the outspoken head of the youth faction of the National Religious Party, Education Minister Zevulun Hammer. A skillful politician, Hammer led the National Religious Party away from its relatively flexible position on West Bank concessions and toward its current position opposing any withdrawals. Hammer and the youth faction are closely allied to the militant Gush Emunim settlement organization and have actively supported the Gush's right to settle in the West Bank.

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[] In certain respects, Hammer may even be to the right of Begin; he is, for instance, on record as opposing the removal of any settlements in Golan, although he is willing to offer Syria certain unspecified "arrangements" regarding Israel's role in that area.

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[] Hammer has already successfully challenged Begin over the appointment of a deputy minister of education. The National Religious Party has long coveted the education portfolio, and Hammer is unlikely to tolerate any interference in ministry affairs. []

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ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: Beating War Drums

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[] Tensions between the two countries have risen considerably since Somali-backed guerrillas destroyed at least three bridges on a key Ethiopian railroad early this month, but we do not believe Ethiopia is preparing to invade Somalia in the near future. Ethiopian troops are hard pressed to keep open lines of communication against the Somali-backed guerrillas in eastern Ethiopia, and they are ill-prepared for an attack on Somalia, which has the military edge in the border area.

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[] Addis Ababa is conducting an offensive against the Democratic Union in northern Ethiopia and is training large numbers of militia units, some of which are to be sent to fight in eastern Ethiopia. Ethiopia is unlikely to open another major front while the offensive is under way and before the militia is ready for battle.

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[] Somalia's concern may have been aroused in part by the Ethiopians' recent dispatch of approximately two new battalions to Hararge Province. Mogadiscio may also have learned of Ethiopia's intentions to move M-47 tanks to Jijiga. Addis Ababa, however, has not returned to the Third Division some important units transferred several months ago to fight Eritrean and Democratic Union insurgents.

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[] Somalia probably also prefers to avoid a general conflict soon. We believe, however, that President Siad has concluded that the time is opportune to regain the portion of Ethiopian territory inhabited by ethnic Somalis and claimed by Mogadiscio before Ethiopia's manpower expansion and acquisition of military equipment begins to tilt the military balance in Addis Ababa's favor. Siad probably prefers a further increase in guerrilla activities, but he would be prepared to commit his regular troops if the guerrillas suffered serious reverses.

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[redacted] The coming independence of the FTAI, scheduled for next Monday, has also contributed to the two countries' increased suspicions [redacted]

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[redacted] Ethiopia and Somalia believe the other will attempt to assert its control of an independent Djibouti, but neither appears for now to want a war over the territory. The presence of French troops after independence will help deter direct aggression against Djibouti.

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